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A B S T R A C T
This paper compares the security paradigms for combating terrorism, drugs and irregular migration and argues
that while these have largely failed on their own terms, they have also proven rather successful for the actors
shaping them. Through a spatial political economy analysis of systems of intervention, the paper shows how
vested interests have helped perpetuate counterproductive approaches, while risks (including that of human
suffering) have routinely been ‘exported’ into geographical ‘buffer zones’. In analysing the stakes in such sys-
tems, we deploy the metaphor of games. This term allows us to highlight divergences between ‘official’ goals,
such as ‘winning the war,’ and unstated aims, such as perpetuating security investments, relocating risk or
stoking fear for political gain. Equally important, game terminology helps us highlight the spatial and social
dynamics of collaboration, conflict and rule-manipulation within the system. In exploring these dynamics, the
paper puts focus empirically on the complex collaborations between Western states instigating intervention and
poorer ‘partner states,’ showing how a skewed geopolitical distribution of risk may tilt security interventions in
the instigators' favour while maintaining ‘skin in the game’ for less powerful actors.
1. Introduction
Seventeen years from 9/11 and the start of a full-scale “global war
on terror”, terrorist attacks have been tearing through communities
from Paris and Orlando to Istanbul, Baghdad, Brussels, London and
New York. After years of “combating migration” through border pa-
trolling and wall-building, Europe experienced its most dramatic border
crisis yet in 2014–15, while 2016 saw some 5000 deaths in the
Mediterranean.1And in spite of a long-running “war on drugs”, the
narcotics trade continues to thrive while drug-related offences keep
driving mass incarceration in the US in particular and fatalities keep
mounting in countries such as Mexico and the Philippines.2
In each case, expensive security interventions have fallen short in
terms of the majority of the most loudly expressed aims. Yet these re-
spective interventions retain enduring appeal for policy-makers. Why
so?
To answer this question, we approach these interventions
comparatively as systems through which logics of security consolidate,
benefits accrue, and costs and risks get generated and displaced among
actors positioned differently across political space.3 Our focus on sys-
tems chimes with a broader strand of political analysis that is influ-
enced by complexity theory in the natural sciences (Cairney, 2012; e.g.
Levin et al., 2013 for an ecological view). First, we emphasise the
limitations of focusing on the individual parts of a system and the need
to look holistically at the constant interaction of several different parts.
Second, and building on this complexity perspective when considering
systems of intervention, we emphasise that policy is not set “at the top”
but is shaped by a variety of actors at a variety of levels with a variety of
motives (an approach influenced by e.g. Clay & Schaffer, 1984 and
Mosse, 2004); the point, then, is not to assert that policy “failed” be-
cause of “a lack of political will” (Clay & Schaffer, 1984) but to map the
various political wills and their complex interaction. Third, we em-
phasise that the system as a whole is characterised neither by a simple
policy/implementation dichotomy nor by pure competition but rather
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by a set of relationships (sometimes conflictual, sometimes symbiotic)
that have a certain stability. Fourth, we stress that these complex sys-
tems may be subject (like ecological systems) to rapid change: they are
not as immutable as they appear.
In putting forward such a systemic analysis, we further build on the
political economy of “war systems”, an approach that seeks to explain
the persistence of violence and to illuminate the aims in war other than
“winning” (e.g. Keen, 2012; also Kaldor, 2012; Richani, 2013). Many
such analyses have focused on the economic and political rewards of
continued violence, while an interesting and less commonly explored
strain of analysis has investigated how particular distributions of costs
(across social groups and geographical areas) can encourage either the
continuation of war or (when this distribution changes) some kind of
peace (on benefits, see for example Berdal & Keen, 1997; Le Billon,
2000, 2008; Sherman & Ballentine, 2003; Felbab-Brown, 2017; on
shifting costs in civil war, see, notably, Venugopal, 2009; on interna-
tional conflicts, Shaw, 2005 and Gregory, 2011a).
There is a distinct spatial dimension to how we understand the three
systems of intervention on terror, drugs and migration, as we will see in
coming sections. In a well-known contribution, Derek Gregory extended
pessimistic analyses of an “unending” war on terror (e.g. Duffield,
2007) into a more explicitly geographical dimension, raising the pro-
spect that the entire world might be considered “fair game” for violent
counterterrorism in an “everywhere war” (Gregory, 2011a, p. 242;
Gregory, 2011b). Yet in any kind of war or security intervention, the
point is not just to understand the ruthlessness, expandability and
pervasiveness of the violence but also the limits that are placed upon it
(whether through attempts to protect particular places or people from
the fallout, or through the self-limitations imposed by instigators and
“partners” in their actions). We need to understand the interests served
by these limits as well as the interests served by the violence itself. Our
paper addresses these questions by building comparatively on our long-
running qualitative fieldwork respectively on warfare, including re-
cently on Syria (Keen, 2017), and on migration controls in the EU-
African borderlands (Andersson, 2014). We will examine the spatial
and social distribution of risks, costs and benefits of the three systems of
intervention on terror, drugs and migration, as well as how certain
actors position themselves to “game” — and gain from — the system by
playing on the risks.
In considering these dynamics through a systemic lens, we adopt the
notion of game for its potential to illuminate the conflictive and
sometimes symbiotic relationships among “players” within the three
systems of intervention. A game involves a set of shared rules and overt
competition among adversaries on a circumscribed “playing field”; it
may further involve significant scope for manipulation, collusion and
even rigging of rules, and we will spend considerable time on these
latter aspects. The notion of a game is of course familiar from a range of
scholarly fields, including public choice theory and game theory as
applied to security interventions (e.g. Alpern, Morton, & Papadaki,
2011; Bier and Azaiez 2009). We do not approach it through such
formal modelling, however. Rather, we use game to understand and
describe how security actors position themselves in relation to stated
and unstated goals. In this, we consciously limit our attention to a set of
key actors (or “players”) within the three systems of intervention:
governments instigating the security interventions; instigating-state
security actors (law enforcement and defence); “partner” governments
collaborating in the interventions; and finally, partner governments’
security actors. Several caveats can be noted in relation to this rather
schematic parsing of key actors or players. First, the systems of inter-
vention, certainly, are broader than these actors alone – including
corporations providing security technology and NGOs alternately col-
laborating with and challenging governments (cf. Andersson, 2014).
Second, there are struggles aplenty not just among these core and non-
core sectors, but also within governments and state agencies, making
these far from unitary actors (a point we return to in our conclusion).
And third, we recognise that a distinction between (political)
government and (institutional/bureaucratic) “security actors” in en-
forcement is not without its nuances (as later sections will also allude
to). However, for the purpose of clarity, this schema works as a starting
point for considering the interests, games and gains with the systems of
intervention.
One influence for our approach is Peter Andreas (2009: xiv), who
some years ago treated US-Mexico border enforcement as a “border
game” in order to capture “its performative and audience-directed
nature” as well as “the strategic interaction between border enforcers
and illegal border crossers”. Expanding on Andreas' conceptualisation,
we may delineate several levels at which the notion of a game is ana-
lytically useful. First, consider the enforcer-target interaction. Attempts at
combating perceived transnational threats (migration, terrorism, nar-
cotics) are often portrayed as a game (sometimes a “chase”) both from
practitioner (emic) and academic (etic) viewpoints. At the US-Mexico
border, the Border Patrol's crackdowns are frequently referred to as a
“cat and mouse game” (Donato, Wagner, & Patterson, 2008), with some
Border Patrol agents approaching their task as “a game of tag and
catch” (Heyman, 1995, p. 270). In the war on terror, operatives often
talk of their interventions as a game of “whack-a-mole”, while analysts
highlight how drone attacks resemble a chase or hunt (Chamayou,
2015). Many of these idioms – “whack-a-mole” or “cat-and-mouse” –
hint at the frustrations besetting the quest to chase elusive threats,
which have tended to displace, proliferate or change character in re-
sponse to enforcement. This is a theme we will consider in the first
section below.
Second, the game metaphor highlights an important performative
dimension in attempts to combat politically “securitised” problems
(Andreas, 2009; Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998), including its staging
in highly visible geographical spaces (De Genova, 2002). The game
metaphor also points to a clash between the political desire spectacu-
larly and symbolically to “crack down” on a problem on the one hand,
and the practical complications in actually curbing it, on the other
hand. At the US-Mexico border, the stated aim of “combating migration”
is in conflict with the business need for low-skilled migrant labour
(though the two aims are partially reconciled in the creation of a “de-
portable” workforce: see De Genova, 2002; Heyman, 1995). Further,
the stated aim works politically, in stoking fears and at the same time
holding out the hope of allaying such fears through largely symbolic
security intervention – a point we will develop in the second section
below.
A third dimension to the game metaphor will form the principal
focus of our paper: it helps us to illuminate the relationships and posi-
tioning among security actors tasked with carrying out the interventions.
Game points towards a set of (unscripted) rules for interaction in a
particular “field”.4 In this security field, dominant and dominated
“players” take up, defend, and seek recognition for their positions,
while safeguarding their interests. This line of analysis is familiar from
studies of security professionals (e.g. Bigo, 2014), a line we expand
substantially in our third section below by considering how the colla-
borations among Western and “partner state” security actors often end
up undermining the stated rationales and “rules” set by the dominant
players.
Again, scholarship on warfare points us towards some of these
manipulations under exceptional conditions. In earlier work on Sierra
Leone's war, Keen (2005) found that civilians used the term “sell-game”
– a football match fixed in advance – to describe a situation of collusion
between soldiers and rebels. The “failure” of government troops to
defeat rebels could be explained in part by considering how soldiers and
their commanders had many priorities (diamond mining, staying alive,
supporting an ousted regime) that differed from – and often interfered
with – “winning the war”. Soldiers sometimes collaborated with the
rebels they were supposed to be confronting, even selling them arms.
4 The term is used here in both a Bourdieusian and a geographical sense.
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Rather than understanding such war as a “fight” between two opposing
sides, we may be better off thinking of it geographically as a resource-
rich zone into which a variety of military formations (rebels, govern-
ment soldiers, peacekeepers, civil defence forces) are sent, whereupon
they get “deflected” from their original – or at least originally expressed
– aims. In this sense, the “game” played in this kind of “war system” was
what may be termed a double or duplicitous game in which, alongside a
highly visible set of rules and an expressed objective of winning, there
existed another set of “unscripted” rules and unstated objectives cen-
tring on a coveted geographical zone.
We see many such examples of collusion, subversion and abetting in
the war on terror, the war on drugs and the fight against migration,
whose security rationales and funding provisions tend to generate
perverse incentives. In particular, “partners” have an incentive to play
up the dangers they are claiming to combat while actually neglecting to
confront these problems.
With this relational perspective in mind, we also delineate an im-
portant fourth dimension of the security games: namely the “game of
risk”, or the quest to distribute risks to the advantage of instigating
players. In section four below, we argue that the negative consequences
of our three interventions have been very unevenly distributed, with
key instigating countries and actors avoiding some (but not all) of the
worst risks and costs – turning the layered game back in the instigators’
favour.
In sum, our usage of game allows us to approach jointly several
spheres that are frequently considered separately: first, the enforcer-
target interaction; second, the performative dimension of security; and
third, the conflictive (and sometimes symbiotic) relationship among
security actors. In addition, we bring in a spatial and social con-
sideration of risk distribution as a key factor in understanding the dy-
namics of the three security interventions. This four-dimensional
framing of the game helps take us away from the frequently cited gap
between practitioner and political readings of security, or between
“governance” and “politics” (e.g. Follis, 2016; Walters, 2014). How-
ever, we should not fall into the fallacy of seeing different layers of the
game as engaged in a zero-sum interaction, nor as a hierarchical
layering: rather, again from a systems perspective, an intervention may
be “useful” to participants on one or several levels at once, while si-
multaneously problematic for them on another level. It is in this non-
hierarchised sense that the dimensions discussed below need to be
understood.
2. The cat-and-mouse game: chasing the supply
Practitioner metaphors such as “game of tag and catch” or “whack-
a-mole” are not just sarcastic remarks but point towards a specific logic
of intervention: the centrality – and in many ways the futility – of
cracking down on the “supply side” of the problem that is ostensibly
being “combated”. Economic analyses have long noted that the “war on
drugs” focuses on cracking down on the supply of narcotics, rather than
targeting persistent demand in destination states (LSE IDEAS, 2014). For
Western governments targeting drugs, their key metrics centre on levels
of drug production, arrests of key drug lords and restriction of parti-
cular routes. Similarly “supply-centric” interventions can be observed
in our two other security interventions. The war on terror tends to focus
on numbers of terrorists killed or neutralized. The fight against irre-
gular migration tends to focus on the number of migrants and smug-
glers halted or detained (Albahari, 2018). In all three cases, “root
causes” have been sidelined, despite frequent lip service to them. If
persistent high demand is a key neglected problem in drugs interven-
tions, counterterror efforts have routinely ignored or exacerbated the
reasons and desires for engaging in, or supporting, acts of terrorism. In
the case of border security the demand for low-cost labour in destina-
tion countries has been routinely neglected, as have the causes and
motivations for moving in the first place (including global inequality,
civil conflict, and unequally distributed refugee protection). The
security “game” being played, in other words, has been framed so to
exclude certain political lines of action and to give the impression of an
arena in which a fearsome adversary is being “fought back”, often
through military means.
Yet this security game remains riddled with “own goals”. In the drug
wars, “supply-centric” interventions have repeatedly been shown to
reproduce the problem ostensibly being fought. Spending on drug
control has increased massively – reaching an estimated $50bn a year
from state and federal budgets in the US alone, with global spending
estimated at about twice that amount (Castillo, Mejía, & Restrepo,
2014, p. 70). Yet as the LSE's Expert Group on drugs control noted:
[T]he pursuit of a militarised and enforcement-led global “war on
drugs” strategy has produced enormous negative outcomes and
collateral damage … [including] mass incarceration in the US,
highly repressive policies in Asia, vast corruption and political de-
stabilisation in Afghanistan and West Africa, immense violence in
Latin America, an HIV epidemic in Russia, an acute global shortage
of pain medication and the propagation of systematic human rights
abuses around the world. (LSE IDEAS, 2014:3).
The US currently houses one-quarter of the global imprisoned po-
pulation, and every year from 1993 to 2009 saw more people being
jailed in the US for drug crimes than for violent crimes, with African
Americans three to four times more likely than whites to be arrested for
drug crimes (Drug Policy Alliance, 2016; Rothwell, 2015). Meanwhile,
the RAND Drug Policy Research Centre noted in 2005 that “[t]he
overall trend in cocaine and heroin retail prices during most of the past
two decades has been downward (after adjusting for potency)”
(Caulkins, Reuter, Martin, & James, 2005, p. 7). In general, even when
drug prices have risen, a relatively low price elasticity for addictive
substances tends to sustain consumption (LSE IDEAS, 2014: 3, 9), while
consumers have often resorted to dangerous means of consumption
under the auspices of strengthened criminal networks (Carpenter,
2014). Further, in what is sometimes referred to as a “balloon effect”,
crackdowns in one place tend to push trade elsewhere. Such crack-
downs tend to be associated with rising violence in the new sites of
transit, as evidenced by the rising homicide rate in Mexico following
the large-scale interdiction in Colombia from 2007 (LSE IDEAS,
2014:29; Castillo et al., 2014).
Similar startling failures have been seen in the war on terror. For all
the huge effort at counterterrorism (and the associated invasions) since
September 2001, the number of terrorist attacks in the world has sky-
rocketed, rising from 3329 in 2000 to 29,376 in 2015 (Global Terrorism
Index, 2015; 2016). Meanwhile, the number of fighters in Islamist-in-
spired terrorist organisations more than tripled from 32,200 in 2000 to
in excess of 110,000 in 2013 (Goepner, 2016, p. 113). The greatest
expenditure of Western effort and money – and the greatest loss of life
for Western soldiers – has been in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet both
countries have been beset by large numbers of terrorist attacks since
invasion. Frequently, such violence is taken to justify the intervention,
and even to necessitate more of it. As John Kerry said when debating
with George W. Bush in 2004: “The President just talked about Iraq as a
centre of the war on terror. Iraq was not even close to the centre of the
war on terror before the President invaded it.”5 Meanwhile, attacks in
Western cities have spread fear well beyond the initial theatres of op-
erations. In many countries, al Qaida and ISIS have successfully
exploited Western military interventions for propaganda purposes
(Cronin, 2015; Gerges, 2005). Indeed, terrorists have sometimes been
explicit in seeking a heavy-handed military response that will win them
more recruits (Bolt, 2012; Gerges, 2005; Juergensmeyer, 2002). Civi-
lian deaths arising from such military responses may attract support for
terrorist groups, while indiscriminate military responses also tend to
5 First pre-election debate, 2004. See Robert Scheer, “US Is Its Own Worst
Enemy in Iraq”, Los Angeles Times, accessed at www.globalpolicy.org).
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remove civilians’ incentives to distance themselves from terrorists (cf
Kalyvas, 2004).
Although the “fight against migration” has sometimes had a rather
less belligerent framing, nevertheless disastrous results from supply-
centric interventions have been evident. In Europe, maritime migration
hardly existed before a shift to stringent visa rules for North Africans in
southern EU countries in the early 1990s. Since then, a series of highly
politicised “border crises” of escalating severity has unfolded alongside
tighter border security. In a context where people lack safe and legal
pathways, border security initiatives have produced recurrent “balloon”
effects – pushing migrants towards dangerous routes and more pre-
carious entry methods while feeding the smuggling business along these
new, riskier crossings. This has led to thousands of fatalities and ever-
mounting chaos (Andersson, 2016; Cosgrave, Hargrave, Foresti, &
Massa, 2016). While the spike in arrivals of 2015 came to an end after
an EU-Turkey accord, the underlying destructive dynamics remain the
same, as seen in the escalating fatality ratio and dramatic suffering on
the central Mediterranean route. The fight against migration, and its
associated “war on smuggling”, have here led to stronger demand for
smugglers (Albahari, 2018). In the United States, besides the diffusion
of violence (Squire, 2014) and increasingly powerful smuggling net-
works, one principal effect of border security has been a growing un-
documented population inland: millions of Mexicans have stayed on as
irregular migrants rather than circulating back from seasonal US-based
work owing to border security obstacles (Massey, Pren, & Jorge, 2016).
In short, by visibly targeting the “supply” of drugs, terrorists or
migrants/smugglers while largely leaving demand unaddressed, the
three security interventions have often worsened the problem they os-
tensibly combat by generating more distressing dynamics, including
criminal innovation, chaotic scenes and rising fatalities. Why, then, do
governments continue down the same path?
As suggested in our introduction, even if an intervention is failing to
achieve the expressed goals, participants may still accrue benefits and
succeed in unstated or less-advertised goals. The system may also adjust
to “failure”, notably by putting some spatial, social and chronological
limits on the fallout as problems get loaded onto peripheral or buffer
zones, onto politically marginal groups, and even onto the future.
Meanwhile, delimited and short-term political and financial gains may
swiftly multiply in the instigating state, as the next section will show.
3. The high political game: fuelling fears and purveying solutions
The framing of our three security games as a “fight” against a par-
ticular phenomenon already constitutes a political win, even if the
practical results prove disappointing. The economic benefits in core
countries, and for key security actors, are also considerable. These two
dimensions – the political and the economic – need to be considered
together, as they are fundamentally entangled. We will do so in this
section by, in tandem, considering the political and financial/institu-
tional gains from the war on drugs, the war on terror and the fight
against migration.
Consider, first, the war on drugs. While moral panics around nar-
cotics significantly preceded President Nixon's launch of the “war” in
the 1970s (Nadelmann, 1990), a profitable system of intervention grew
swiftly in the United States from this time onwards. Anti-drug funding
further rocketed in the 1980s under President Reagan, as did the
“prison-industrial complex” (Alexander, 2012, pp. 49–50). Meanwhile,
programmes for prevention of drug addiction, treatment and for re-
levant education were severely scaled back. One study of the bur-
geoning US prison system noted that Reagan's large cuts to welfare
programs exempted law enforcement agencies in the context of a re-
launched “war on crime”, including especially the drug wars. Alexander
(2012:335) notes:
When it came to the bellicose branches of government … – what
Reagan called the “legitimate functions” – he countenanced bu-
reaucratic bloat at every turn. The crime war became his domestic
equivalent of the cold war.
Meanwhile, targeting “drug criminals” seems to have been part of a
wider project of intimidation with a distinctly racial dimension. African
Americans were targeted and incarcerated disproportionately (Parenti,
2008; Perkinson, 2010). Crack users were treated far more harshly than
(richer) cocaine users, and by the early 1990s nearly 90 per cent of
crack prosecutions targeted African Americans (ibid.). Significantly,
Nixon had originally launched the domestic war on drugs in the context
of widespread social unrest and anti-war protests. This “war” sent out
an intimidating message to the black population and anti-war protesters
(Parenti, 2008). John Erlichman, a former White House Counsel, said in
1994 that Nixon “had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people”:
We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the
[Vietnam] war or black, but by getting the public to associate the
hippies and marijuana with African Americans and heroin, and then
criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We
could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings,
vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we
were lying about the drugs? Of course we did (Baum, 2017, np).
Nixon was well aware of the electoral benefits from getting tough in
the wars on crime and drugs. As Parenti (2008) notes, surveillance in-
creased sharply, and Nixon's Organized Crime Control Bill was used to
summon protesters before secret “special grand juries” for interroga-
tion.
To move on to the war on terror, gains within the West from its
“failures” have also been significant. As the old Soviet enemy receded,
the spectre of terror presented an opportunity for vast continued in-
vestments in the military-industrial complex, which since then has re-
mained very close to post-Cold War levels (Keen, 2012): according to
one careful calculation in 2006, the Pentagon was absorbing fully 42
per cent of US tax dollars (Hossein-zadeh, 2006). One of the main ar-
guments against the war on terror is the extremely high cost to the
taxpayer: one tally puts the cost of the war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Syria as well as Homeland Security at $3.6 trillion in
current dollars between 2001 and 2016 (Crawford, 2016). But this as-
tronomical cost may also help to explain the persistence of the war on
terror despite all its counterproductive effects: every purchase, after all,
is also a sale.
Political gains have also been substantial: to mention but one well-
known example, President George W. Bush's waning popular support
rallied strongly with the declaration of a “war on terror” after 9/11,
while the “tough” stance also seems to have helped his re-election in
2004 (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). The fear of terrorism is politi-
cally effective (Robin, 2004), and neoconservatives – and more recently
President Trump – have routinely exploited it.
In international migration, fear and an “emergency” framing have
similarly been useful for powerful Western actors, both economically
and politically. On the economic side, corporate lobbying has helped
convince governments to increase spending on punitive migrant de-
tention, border barriers, surveillance technology, and military hard-
ware (Bigo & Jeandesboz, 2010). In the US, the fight against migration
has multiplied US Border Patrol personnel and the budget of Customs
and Border Protection under the post-9/11 Department for Homeland
Security (Massey et al., 2016). The same holds true in Europe, as
southern European border, military and law enforcement forces have
had their resources increased via the fight against migration, while the
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EU border agency Frontex has seen strong growth to deal with its ever-
larger agenda. (Figs. 1 and 2).
The fuelling of fears around migration has also often conferred
significant political benefits – especially when combined with the “wars”
on drugs and terror in a discrete political-physical space such as the US-
Mexico border or the Mediterranean.
In the US, the post-9/11 period saw the southwest border becoming
heavily securitised, with migration interdiction framed as halting po-
tential terrorists (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012). In Europe, while the se-
curitisation of migration may in the past have taken less extreme forms
(Huysmans, 2006), since 2015 the external borders have served as a
lightning rod for hard-right denunciations of an “invasion”. Here, the
drama at the borders is deployed politically to silence alternatives and
to present border enforcement as the only feasible solution to the
“emergency”.
As in the war on terror, with its frequent exaggeration of the actual
threat (Lemieux, 2016), the fight against migration depends on a de-
ceptive numbers game that inflates the fears of “invasion”: the vast
majority of migrants (legal or otherwise) arrive by air, not land and sea
(Andersson, 2016) – a trend that is even clearer once we take the one-
off record year of 2015 out of the equation. Yet the fanning of fears of
mass migration across the sea has repeatedly been deployed politically,
for instance, by Italy's Silvio Berlusconi on Lampedusa in 2011; by the
Spanish government in its “border crises” of 2005, 2006 and 2014
Fig. 1. Enacted US Border Patrol budget by fiscal year, 1990–2017 (millions of dollars). Source: https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-year-
budget-statistics-fy-1990-fy-2017
Fig. 2. Frontex budget, 2005–2018 (millions of euros). This is merely illustrative: most border security spending occurs on member state level. Source: https://
frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/key-documents/
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(Andersson, 2014); by Hungary's right-wing government in 2015
(Haraszti, 2015); and by the UK in Calais, with the “emergency” there
featuring heavily in Britain's right-wing newspapers in the run-up to the
2016 Brexit vote.
To conclude, while the three security interventions on terror, mi-
gration and drugs may be counterproductive and ill-conceived in rela-
tion to their most widely stated aims, they also present remarkable
“successes” for powerful actors involved in propagating them.
Politically, they fuel citizens' fears that (when amplified by the media)
allow governments to impose drastic measures that seem to assuage
such fears while also providing an effective diversionary tactic in terms
of rallying anxious voters and shifting blame for societal problems
elsewhere. Economically, the various security actors involved in im-
plementing the interventions expand their operations and prestige not
simply in spite of the systems’ failings but also because of them. Given
the political and economic functions of the phenomena ostensibly being
confronted, even an “own goal” has many uses.
4. Gaming the system: partnership and subversion
So far, we have considered the enforcer-target “game” and the po-
litical-economic dimensions of “gaming the problem” within instigating
Western states. Next, we will consider the double games played by non-
Western partner countries. Here we find substantial scope for ostensible
partners to manipulate the rules and even set some of their own. Both
instigating and partner governments have often paid lip-service to a
“joint” endeavour that few actors believe is actually going to work,
while perverse incentives keep generating more of the problem osten-
sibly being combated.
We identify three overlapping ways in which the official game may
be subverted. First, by appearing to collaborate, something that occurs
when partner states that are known to be involved with criminals,
terrorists and so on readily trumpet short-term “successes” to the in-
stigating/donor state. Second, by stoking the threat, something that oc-
curs when partner states actively seek to worsen high-profile problems
or even collaborate with enemies. Third, by seeking impunity, which
occurs when partner states take advantage of the political goodwill and
resources obtained from signing up to a global struggle by engaging in
(and sometimes escalating) domestic repression. In all cases, as we shall
see, the political and financial importance that instigating states give to
“combating the threat” in the official game is what allows these double
games to develop.
To start again with the war on drugs, the benefits of at least ap-
pearing to collaborate have often proven substantial for partner states.
US aid to Mexico has been designed, in part, to encourage a clampdown
on drugs: between financial years 2008 and 2017, Congress appro-
priated nearly $2.8 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative for
combating drug trafficking and organised crime (Ribando Seelke &
Finklea, 2017, p. 11). Yet such programmes may create a perverse in-
centive to promote the persistence of the problem. These also rarely
acknowledge how, within “buffer” states such as Mexico, there have
been longstanding symbiotic relationships between senior military of-
ficers, law enforcement and the drug cartels. Such is the corruption in
the Mexican police that the entire police force of Veracruz, a major
drugs conduit, was dissolved in December 2011 (Keen, 2012). In Co-
lombia, the pre-eminent US partner, a pre- and post-9/11 war on terror
combined damagingly with a war on drugs, propping up abuses by
counterinsurgency actors while at the same time minimising the at-
tention paid to grievances that helped inform rebellion (Fajardo, 2003;
Restrepo & Spagat, 2005).6 In many ways, the repressive apparatus of
the state has depended on positioning itself as an ally of the US in one or
more supply-centred security intervention.
An example of both appearing to collaborate and of seeking
impunity comes from further south, in Guatemala. With the end of
Guatemala's civil war in 1996, a “war on crime/drugs” came to provide
a rationale for high military spending at a point when the country's
swollen military risked major downsizing. During our fieldwork in
2002, Edgar Gutierrez, head of civil intelligence, stressed that shadowy
structures linked to the old counterinsurgency were now involved not
only in the “war on crime” but in many of the criminal enterprises that
they claimed to be combating. Clandestine intelligence organisations
were being used to fight organised crime, and “this same apparatus and
method have been used to intimidate the human rights organisations.”
As in Colombia, the “criminal” enemy helped sustain flows of external
aid as well as continued impunity for official and semi-official attacks
on “subversives”.7 Katherine Saunders-Hastings (2015) has shown how
the Guatemalan army has continued to recover from its vulnerable si-
tuation at the end of the civil war by positioning itself as the most ef-
fective and least corrupt of the institutions involved in combating crime
and drugs, while politicians have benefited from being seen as “tough
on crime”. Yet crime has routinely been shunted into other parts of
Guatemala City and beyond, in another predictable “balloon effect”.
Turning to counterterror interventions, we not only see attempts at
appearing to collaborate and seeking impunity, but also a more active
stoking of the threat. Indeed, the global war on terror has since 2001
created perverse incentives for non-Western governments to fuel – or at
least allow – the threat of terrorism, attracting international approval
and resources in the process. At the same time, government security
structures (and security organisations linked to government) have fre-
quently engaged in limited (and usually well-publicised) actions to
show their value as partners, switching back and forth between ap-
pearing to collaborate and stoking the threat. Scholars and reporters
have observed this pattern in Afghanistan, where an anti-Taliban
agenda helped cement a government that itself included abusive war-
lords and where a symbiotic relationship grew up between the Taliban
and security firms that were paid large sums to provide protection
against them (Galbraith, 2010; Rashid, 2007; Wilder, 2009). In Yemen,
the government's desire to eliminate its ostensible enemies (notably al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) has repeatedly been questioned in a
context where the terrorist threat was serving to justify both aid and
repression (Attree, 2016; Phillips, 2011; Whitaker, 2010). In conflict-hit
northern Mali, meanwhile, evidence suggests that the presence of a ji-
hadist threat has been actively abetted by an Algerian regime that saw
the benefits of participating in a war on terror (e.g. Keenan, 2013).
Meanwhile, the Malian government has itself benefited from close ties
to criminal groups that it has ostensibly been opposing.
Let us consider two cases, Sri Lanka and Syria, in a little more detail,
as they illustrate well the three forms of double-gaming (collaborating,
stoking and seeking impunity) delineated above, as well as the overlaps
between them. In Sri Lanka, the government's avowed commitment to a
“war on terror” helped secure a significant degree of international
quietude in relation to escalating official abuses against the Tamils that
culminated in the killing of possibly 40,000 or more Tamil civilians
trapped alongside abusive Tamil Tiger rebels in northeastern Sri Lanka
in 2009 (United Nations (UN), 2011). The “war on terror” discourse
proved useful for the Rajapaksa government not only in legitimising
attacks on Tamils but also in intimidating journalists, lawyers, aid
workers and human rights groups, and in providing cover for economic
exploitation, including the forcible takeover of a large number of
companies by the Rajapaksa family and its associates (Weiss, 2012;
Keen's fieldwork). Although nominally “weak” relative to Western
powers, Sri Lanka was able to use the fear of terrorism, the fear of a
Sinhalese nationalist backlash, and rivalry between donors to man-
oeuvre itself into a position where it was effectively dictating terms to
aid organisations and to donor governments (which one might have
expected to shape “the rules of the game”: Goodhand, 2010; Keen's
6 Compare Gordon, 2011 on Afghanistan. 7 Interview with David Keen.
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fieldwork). While the Rajapaksa regime was quick to trumpet victory in
2009, it was also anxious to stress that the struggle against terror – and
the “state of emergency” – was ongoing.
In Syria, amid a “global war on terror”, the highly abusive gov-
ernment of Bashar al-Assad created a degree of ambivalence in the in-
ternational community (and a heightened level of impunity) by pre-
senting itself as a bulwark against “Islamist extremism” and terrorism.
Yet behind the scenes the Assad regime has also engaged in actions that
helped nurture extremist groups, notably ISIS/Daesh. Reports abound of
collusion by government actors in terrorist attacks that were blamed on
Islamist terrorists, while the regime released violent jihadists from
prison and exempted ISIS from the bulk of regime military actions
(Khalaf, 2015; Keen, 2017; cf Weiss and Hassan (2015) on Assad's
strategy in Iraq). In December 2014, open-source data showed the re-
gime's “counterterrorism operations – more than two-thirds of which
were airstrikes – skew heavily towards groups whose names aren't ISIS.
Of 982 counterterrorism operations for the year up through Nov. 21
[2014], just 6 percent directly targeted ISIS.”8 By understanding the
geographical limits to violence, we get a much better sense of the role of
the “global war on terror” in incentivising these kinds of collaborative
and duplicitous relationships.
Turning finally to the fight against irregular migration, we should
first note how signing up to this “fight” has given impunity to gov-
ernments from Morocco to Mauritania and Turkey – and this impunity
has been notably bolstered by active stoking of the threat. Morocco has
obtained substantial diplomatic leeway with Europe (notably in re-
ference to occupied Western Sahara) by presenting itself as a bulwark
against migration, a bulwark that may at any time stop functioning. To
take but one of many recurring examples of such a withdrawal of
controls, in early 2017, after a European Court of Justice ruling ex-
cluded Western Sahara from EU-Morocco trade deals, Moroccan au-
thorities suggested they might stop playing the “gendarme” of Europe.
Soon a border crisis ensued at the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, where sub-
Saharan migrants yet again climbed the fortified fences with minimal
Moroccan control (El Confidencial, 2017).
If these are examples of political gains, there are also – as in the
wars on drugs and terror – substantial economic gains to be had for key
“partner” governments and underfunded state agencies in both ap-
pearing to collaborate and in selective stoking. Turkey is the starkest
example today: the country was promised billions of euros in aid as well
as free movement for its citizens into the EU on the back of a deal in
which it agreed to stem the flow of Syrian migrants, setting the stage for
further demands (Greenhill, 2016). Not only have agencies (besides
governments) in “partner states” benefited from such largesse, but they
have in parallel kept tapping into the cross-border smuggling business,
where (as in the war on drugs) evidence shows they often play a fun-
damental role as facilitators (see, e.g., Bradol, 2018). Besides state
agencies, in some countries paramilitary groups have also been seeking
to tap into the promise of funds, exemplified by the efforts of Libyan
militias and of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (which grew out of Jan-
jaweed militias responsible for genocide in Darfur) to bring crackdowns
on migrants and smugglers to international attention at a time when the
EU is committing large funds to halting irregular migration in colla-
boration with African regimes through its “Partnership Framework”, an
“Emergency Trust Fund for Africa”, and associated initiatives.9
Often the double games around terrorism, drugs and migration have
combined, multiplying the potential gains, as seen from Mali to Mexico
and Turkey. The most effective player on these overlapping fields was
long Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. Having been ostracised and labelled a
sponsor of terrorism, Gaddafi strategically clawed his way back onto
the international stage in part by offering to help “rein in” international
terrorism, and in part by offering to control migration flows. In return,
Gaddafi asked for – and to a large extent received – political and eco-
nomic favours, including the lifting of the embargo; the expensive
Libya-Italy “Friendship Pact” of 2008; and the transfer of resources for
controlling migration (Rinelli, 2016). As relationships with Western
countries eroded and NATO launched its air strikes in 2011, Gaddafi
shifted fully from “collaboration” to stoking, as he threatened to un-
leash an “unprecedented wave of illegal immigration” on southern
European shores.10
In sum, in the complex and layered games occurring among osten-
sible partners in fighting drugs, terror or migration, it is no longer clear
that the instigating, dominant players are in control. Instead, the rules
are being actively subverted and remade by ostensibly weaker partners.
Governments and other influential actors within non-Western countries
are often seen as subjected to one-way “policy transfers” – in other
words, as rule- or regime-takers rather than “regime makers” (Ruggie,
1982) – yet as we have seen, they have frequently been able to barter
their apparent cooperation for political favours, economic resources
and impunity for their own abuses.
These dynamics have tended towards escalation within the systems
of intervention, as especially evident in strategies of stoking. We may
draw on Byman's (2006) work on perverse incentives in counter-
insurgency, as well as on de Waal's (2015) notion of the “political
marketplace”, to suggest that, once perceived (security) threats are
accorded supreme value, the temptation to stoke the relevant threat
increases. As with any “price” or “barter”, the terms of trade are in-
fluenced by the perceived desperation of the relevant parties. In fact,
the more Western governments have made explicit the extreme priority
they are giving to combating a given phenomenon (notably by placing
it within an existential “security” and/or “war” paradigm), the more
difficult it has been for the instigators to threaten to withdraw assis-
tance from cooperating “partners”, and the worse the terms of trade are
likely to be for the instigators. All this means that apparent “regime
takers” are best conceived not as passive recipients of “Western policy”,
but as active participants in a complex game where the official rules are
complemented by unscripted, tacit and partially hidden ones (cf Scott,
1992).
5. Shifting the goalposts: games of risk
Returning to the game as seen by the instigators, this section in-
troduces further complexity. Even amid failure in terms of most of the
loudly expressed goals and in terms of dealing with these various pro-
blems, we are not witnessing total failure when it comes to reducing – or
one might better say distributing, delimiting and relocating – the var-
ious risks that these wars or fights claim to address.
Nothwithstanding the numerous problems with ‘supply-sided’ in-
tervention in the war on drugs, it could be argued that consumption
might have been even higher if prices had been lower (Caulkin in LSE
IDEAS, 2014). Meanwhile, a large proportion of the collateral costs of
prohibition has been displaced onto producer and transit countries (LSE
IDEAS, 2014:6). States collaborating in drug control have suffered from
growing usage among their own citizens on top of severe criminality
and violence, as seen in Mexico.
Notwithstanding the numerous terror attacks in the West, Lemieux
(2016) notes only 3 percent of deaths caused by a growing number of
terrorist attacks occurred in Western countries in the period
2000–2014, with the bulk of terror attacks concentrated in a handful of
mainly Muslim countries. In counterterror operations, further, the use
of drones and “vertical” forms of power (Elden, 2013) minimises the
risk to Western combatants, as does the focus on “hard security” for the
reduced numbers of personnel deployed on the ground (Chamayou,
8 Vinograd & Ammar Cheikh Omar, 2014.
9 See e.g. Sudan Tribune, 24 January 2017: http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article61475.
10Guardian, 29 March 2012: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
mar/29/migrant-boat-disaster-who-responsible.
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2015). By contrast, countries that collaborate in the war on terror have
often found themselves on the frontline of violence and even (as with
Turkey after its strikes on ISIS) retaliation.
These dynamics reflect what Shaw (2005) calls “risk-transfer war” –
a reaction, in part, to American casualties during the Vietnam war. At
the same time, the contemporary “export” of war-on-terror casualties to
poorer countries represents in many ways an extension of a Cold War
pattern (not to mention of the colonialism that predated it), as the Cold
War saw “superpower” conflicts being fought out mostly in “Third
World” countries such as Vietnam, Guatemala and Afghanistan. Sig-
nificantly, today's radically skewed distribution of costs and risks also
feeds a common perception that “only Western lives count”, a com-
plaint used for mobilisation purposes by some terrorists (for example
bin Laden: Slim, 2007, p. 150). In our fieldwork on the Syria conflict,
many Syrians stressed that terrorist groups have benefited from a per-
ception that the West (because of a preoccupation with Western ca-
sualties) is hostile to ISIS but not to Assad (Keen, 2017).
The concept of containment – another inheritance from the Cold
War and, in different guises, the colonial period – has, as Duffield
(2001) argues, been put to new uses in today's era of proliferating
transnational threats. On one interpretation, we now have a three-tier
zonal system of unevenly distributed security risk. In the “outermost”
tier, we find regions of the world that resemble “kill zones” (in US
counterterror parlance) where the dangers resulting from wrong-
headed wars proliferate. Barriers of different kinds (military, legal,
border security) go up to limit the fallout as Western countries attempt
to confine risk to the region – in effect establishing a middle tier of
“buffer zones” in the global borderlands that have a key role in “ab-
sorbing” refugees (86 per cent of refugees are today hosted by low- and
middle-income countries11). In the innermost tier, finally, we find
Western countries, which (while failing in many of their most loudly
expressed goals) are in some respects protected from some of the gra-
vest risks arising in large part from their own interventions.
This typology is simply a broad (and state-centric) starting point for
considering risk distributions in the three security interventions. The
zones can certainly be disaggregated into countries and subnational
regions – something that helps to explain political tensions over inter-
vention. The instigators of the war on terror (the US and the UK), for
instance, have been among the least affected by its fallout in terms of
forced migration from Iraq and Afghanistan; similarly, the sharply
rising migratory “risk” stemming from the NATO bombardment of
Libya (led by the UK, the US and France) has been weighted towards
other European (and non-European) states dealing with the bulk of the
influx. The US has been relatively insulated from international ter-
rorism since 9/11 (though less so from US-born terrorists), while
countries in the western part of continental Europe have faced multiple
acts of terror despite their relatively limited role in the “everywhere
war”.
Further, within Europe's free-movement Schengen area itself, the
EU-wide “fight against migration”, with all its associated instruments
and rules, has helped push the “problem” towards geographical mar-
gins. The strategy, albeit far from failsafe, has consistently been to shift
the risks and responsibilities of disastrous border security to “frontline
states” – that is, far from core northern European destinations. In ad-
dition, pre-emptive crackdowns have been put in place with a view to
preventing people from crossing the external EU border, thereby
transferring risks onto “transit countries”, as in the case of Libya where
EU states have supported the Libyan Coast Guard in forcibly returning
people to detention centres where they face torture and other horren-
dous abuse (Amnesty International, 2017).
The distribution of much of the human, social and even financial
cost to the West's periphery has further served as a form of politically (if
not always practically) efficacious deterrence. Within this system,
human suffering – mass mortality in the Mediterranean, humanitarian
crisis in Greece, and even the biopolitical exceptionality of Libya's
“forced labour camps” and “living hellholes” (UNICEF, 2017; Vaughan-
Williams, 2015) – may perversely appear to some dominant players as a
“win” in deterrence terms. This is implied when officials suggest rescues
in the Mediterranean should be limited since they are said to serve as a
“pull factor”, or when militarised naval patrols are said (however er-
roneously) to destroy the smugglers' “business model” (House of Lords,
2017). Given that more “liberal” goals such as reducing global terrorism
or meeting humanitarian needs have not been achieved, there may be a
temptation retrospectively to redefine goals in more nationalist terms –
and via a more explicit language of deterrence. Indeed, part of the
emerging system involves plucking success from the jaws of failure by
abandoning humanitarian values.
In considering the transfers of risk within systems of intervention,
we must approach risk as double-edged – as a “bundle” involving a
combination of calculated future gains and costs (cf Andersson, in
press). The dominant players calculate that the gains of this risk bundle
will be enough to keep partner states engaged in distributing the pro-
blem in a way favourable to them. They also anticipate that the addi-
tional leverage gained by such “partners” will not outweigh these dis-
tributive gains. As “buffer state” governments use their status to press
for diplomatic or financial favours, they may sometimes successfully
undermine the established rules of the official game, while only rarely
upsetting the unofficial risk distribution game, at least for any con-
siderable period of time.
In sum, as with the civil wars with which we started our paper, the
interlinked disasters occurring in the fight against terror, drugs and
migration thus appear to have functions. Through a systemic analysis of
the kind proposed here, we may illuminate the spatial and political
distribution of risks (in terms of costs and gains) from “failing” inter-
ventions in ways that can powerfully help to explain their persistence.
6. Conclusion: blowing the whistle on double games
The various security games played around terrorism, drugs and
migration provide a powerful tool for explaining why destructive in-
terventions persist. Even though each of the three systems of inter-
vention may “fail” on a global level, they “succeed”, first, in framing a
nebulous issue in narrow political terms; second, in enrolling and re-
warding a very large array of actors, “setting the game” for everyone
else to follow; and third (to a degree), in making sure that risks are
transferred away from “core” to “non-core” players and their territories.
As complexity theory would suggest, such systemic mechanisms are not
neatly and hierarchically organised: “non-linear” causalities abound, as
do negative feedback loops, as seen in the incentives for stoking threats.
Moreover, the system has significant elements of instability, as our
concluding discussion will explore with reference to possible alter-
natives.
But first, let us try to obtain a clearer view of how the objectives of
different players interact within multi-level security games. We may
simplify these interactions between the actors’ objectives in the fol-
lowing analytical terms: symbiosis occurs when one actor approaches its
relationship with another in terms of a shared endeavour or a “win-
win”, notwithstanding their differing objectives. This holds when, for
instance, Washington obtains substantial political capital from wall-
building and Border Patrol deployments while the agencies carrying out
these interventions see their economic interests defended. In its most
extreme case, symbiosis may involve a “sell-game” of the Sierra Leone
kind, where supposed adversaries collude under the radar. Next, sub-
version occurs when a less powerful actor sets out to undermine the
official “rules of the game” by fuelling the problem (or fears associated
with the problem), as we have seen among partner states in the war on
terror and the fight against migration. Finally, redistribution occurs
when a dominant player seeks to transfer or relocate risks to dominated
11 UNHCR figures: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/
unhcr-global-trends-2015.html.
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players – including those risks generated by the intervention itself. This
transfer usually involves both a portion of gains and of costs, in a
conscious trade-off with the partner. However, in its most extreme
form, such redistribution involves a form of “risk dumping”, as seen
when the blocking of refugees seeking to leave Greece from 2015 on-
wards led to perennial encampment with all the risks (political, fi-
nancial, social and human) that this blockage involved for the Greek
state, officials, communities, and for refugees and migrants themselves.
To see these relationships more clearly from each actor's perspec-
tive, we may list them as a table (the left-hand column indicates the
actors from whose viewpoint we are observing the relationship):
The table suggests that Western (instigating) governments as a rule
engage in a symbiotic relationship with their security agencies (and
contractors), while building a redistributive relationship with poorer
“partner” regimes and forces. Meanwhile, partner regimes at times seek
a symbiotic relationship with instigators (by at least appearing to crack
down on a problem) yet may over time be increasingly inclined to turn
this into a subversive relationship, given the incentives to “game the
system”. This subversive tendency is also pronounced among partner-
state security actors, who may seek gains not only from cracking down
on the problem but also from stoking it or simply avoiding dealing with
it.
The complex and interrelated gains suggest that it will be very hard
to shift away from today's disastrous security interventions. In parti-
cular, as long as “core” states send out the message that combating
terror, drugs and migration are overriding priorities, potential partners
will be incentivised to take advantage of these “imperatives” – firstly,
by driving hard bargains that end up damaging human rights and
human welfare and, secondly, by tolerating or fuelling the respective
“threats”.
Such systems will not be uncontested, however. At least three im-
portant sources of opposition – both actual and potential – can be
identified. First, those who lose out within the current systems, while
politically weak in many important respects, can be expected to oppose
them (and often to have good ideas about what policies to favour in-
stead). This will include political opposition within “buffer” states (as
with the coalition against the “war on drugs” in Colombia); it will also
include people within “core” countries (as in the opposition to the mass
incarceration within the US that is a consequence in part of the “war on
drugs”).
Second, besides opening spaces for political contestation, the
“loading” of costs and risks onto actors in the non-core and buffer states
also tends to generate different kinds of “blowback” that negatively
impact even the core states, perhaps after a significant time-lag. For
example, where the EU is ruthlessly exporting migration control to a
country like Libya, the credibility of the EU as a body that stands for
human rights is radically undermined. Or where the costs of war are
perceived as being systematically “confined” to poorer countries, this
may reinforce an urge among both partner states and armed actors to
ensure that some of the “costs” are felt within core countries (even to
the extent of acts of terrorism). Another source of opposition arises from
the fragile claim to be “winning” against terrorism, drugs and migra-
tion, a claim that is vulnerable to the evidence of people's own eyes and
ears as well as to the view, still adhered to by many officials, that policy
should be based on evidence (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). Furthermore,
whether in “core” on “non-core” countries, the parts of the adminis-
tration that have to struggle directly with the costs of current inter-
ventions (for example, foreign, health and development ministries) will
often find themselves in tension with ministries (defence, interior) that
are more committed to enforcing “supply side” policies.
Third, there seems to be a growing momentum behind reforms
based on harm reduction and addressing demand, with the possibility
that hard-won lessons from one setting can be applied to another. In the
“war on drugs” in particular, encouraging steps have been taken to-
wards a focus on harm- and/or demand-reduction rather than a near-
exclusive focus on supply. In Colombia, amid a large fallout from the
US-sponsored war on drugs (in the shape of mass displacement, human
lives lost, and political turmoil), Bogotá has began (albeit in stops and
starts) to pursue a more inclusive approach to peace and to drug con-
trol. Among drug destination regions, meanwhile, Portugal has been
exemplary in decriminalising drugs, in treating addiction as a public
health problem, and in putting in place policies of harm reduction. As
the Colombia and Portugal cases suggest, a wider shift towards harm
reduction and a focus on the wider public good may be the best starting
points for a shift of approach in all three security interventions – and
the instigators of such a shift are likely to be those most badly affected
by the current risk distribution, working effectively as a transnational
coalition.
If this is the “good news”, we must also note some additional “bad
news” – namely that the beneficiaries of the current system can them-
selves be expected to adapt to trends and critiques that call the system
into question. Indeed, they are already doing so. To invoke the complex
biological systems alluded to in our introduction, we may say that just
as medical interventions need to take account of bacterias' resistance to
antibiotics, so too attempts to reform our supply-centric approaches
will need to track (and adapt to) processes of resistance to criticism and
reform. As migration policies fail to prevent major political crises in
Greece and Italy, for example, the conclusion is not necessarily that
these policies have failed but that a more intensive outsourcing of mi-
gration control (and of violence) is necessary – for example, in relation
to Libya, Turkey, Niger and Sudan. Meanwhile, the potential political
fallout from outsourcing migration control is being met with an in-
tensified “de-responsiblisation” – denying knowledge of what is going
on in Libya, Calais, Lesbos or Darfur, for example – and denying one's
own responsibilities in relation to this suffering.
Given these shifting parameters, we wish to highlight one way in
which academic investigators may help produce positive change: via
different parameters of evaluation.
One of the problems with “combating” or “waging war” on some-
thing is that the political stakes for success become so high that it may
not be possible to admit failure. Indeed, instead of being based on
“evidence-based policy”, our three security interventions have been
beset by under-evidenced official reporting that trumpets short-term
“success” without accounting for fundamental “failures” or potentially
massive and damaging side effects (e.g Johnson & Tierney, 2006 and
Goepner, 2016 on the war on terror; Andersson, 2016 and Albahari,
2018 on migration). One way of bringing this case home analytically is
through evaluative parameters that take account of the full risks and
costs of business as usual.
Let us return to a key concern of this paper – that is, how risks are
Instigating governments ‘Partner’ governments Instigating-state security actors Partner-state security actors
Instigating governments Redistribution Symbiosis Redistribution
‘Partner’ governments Subversion/Symbiosis Subversion/Symbiosis Symbiosis/Redistribution
Instigating-state security actors Symbiosis Symbiosis Redistribution
Partner-state security actors Subversion Symbiosis/Subversion Subversion/Redistribution
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generated and unevenly distributed. While the table above sets out
relationships of risk redistribution among systemic security actors, we
should note that the largest transfer of risks and costs does not take
place among core security actors within the system but rather towards
groups with little or no stake in it. In the war on drugs, ordinary Mexicans
have suffered severe violence while public authority has been under-
mined. In the fight against migration, border communities and border-
crossing migrants and refugees have for years suffered under the chaos
and displacement effects caused by business as usual. In the war on
terror, sites of displaced fighting have generated downward spirals with
severe consequences for local societies, as seen for instance in northern
Mali and the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands.
These costs are a form of “negative externalities”, in the sense fa-
miliar from environmental economics: they are not of central concern
to the security players perpetuating the “game”. In fact, we may say
that in this respect, the four types of actors in our table act symbioti-
cally whilst sharing a stake in this particularly skewed distribution of
risks towards third parties. Moreover, they also share an interest in
misidentifying the reasons behind these costs – that is, in portraying the
escalating violence and chaos as disconnected from the functioning of
the system of intervention. The game metaphor, on this level of sys-
temic justification, may be quite simply understood in one of its dic-
tionary definitions: as a “secret and clever plan or trick.”
This is something civil society actors, academics and politicians in
countries such as Colombia have started to note in the war on drugs,
and in so doing they have helped open political space for holistic as-
sessments of the real costs of intervention, which in turn builds momentum
for shifts in policy. In other words, the “fight against the fight” is not
lost. We are overdue a more serious look at the underlying functions of
various “wars”, including their insulation from cost-cutting in times of
austerity; their generation of wide-scale impunity; their active fostering
of human rights abuses and suffering in “buffer” states and border re-
gions; and their endemic blindness to the destructive consequences that
they themselves have induced. In terms of academic efforts, it would
also be worth going beyond the high-stakes “fights” against terror,
drugs and crime and applying a systemic analysis of “gaming” to other
high-profile fields of uneven risk distribution, including climate change,
high finance and the “prison-industrial complex”. As distinct from a
traditional “cost-benefit analysis”, and based on our analysis in this
paper, we would suggest that a range of systems can be analysed in
terms of the social and geographical distribution of costs and benefits –
what we call a “Costs and Benefits of the System” (CBS) analysis.
Whether in relation to our three security interventions or other arenas,
there may be opportunities to use such a framework in more formal
comparative studies as well as in micro or ethnographic studies – par-
ticularly when seeking to explain the longevity of systems that are
failing in important respects and when exploring opportunities for re-
form. In any case, our hope is that a more methodical underpinning for
comparing such distinct areas of policy and public concern, drawing on
an awareness of the politics behind the distribution of risks, costs and
benefits, may help academic and policy analysts to ask different ques-
tions in relation to current “problem areas” of global concern. This may
in turn help shift policy attention towards systemic aspects of inter-
vention and away from the problem “in itself”. The latter, after all, has
usually been framed by powerful actors with a keen eye on their own
interests.
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